civilizations shows, however, that more subtle and diverse understandings of China's future are also at stake, and these contrast in revealing ways to earlier views of historical unfolding.
Participants recognized, as Li Changzhi (李長之 1911-1978) were to put it later, that "culture is a thing with a history." 3 This meant that even radical Westernizers could not follow lateQing reformers in assuming that China's difference from Western nations would eventually be resolved through a universal process of historical evolution. Their conversations wrestled with a growing recognition that what earlier reformers had attempted to borrow from the West-constitutions, human rights, technological advancement-could not be plucked out of the present or awaited in the inevitable future, but had to evolve out of historical institutions, attitudes, and even contingency that could not be replicated very easily.
I advance a close reading of the debate to show how this historicized view of culture enabled particular ways of thinking creatively about cultural change that were not available to then, was not so much a commitment to human universals, as many scholars have assumed, 4 but a faith that the future was the site of cultural transformation and possibility.
Eastern and Western Civilizations

Earlier Iterations
Theoretical speculation about the nature of differences between "Eastern" (or sometimes more specifically "Chinese") and "Western" civilization emerged as early as the Chen's view, the "old Chinese ways" (中國舊法子Zhongguo jiu fazi) and the "new Western ways" (西方新法子xifang xin fazi) each represented seamlessly coherent and interdependent wholes, whose contents were internally indivisible and irreducible. When juxtaposed, these old and new ways were "like fire and water, or ice and coal; they absolutely cannot co-exist.
If you want both to be carried out together, then you will simply produce something that is neither fish nor fowl and neither [old nor new] will be successful. Civilizations" further elaborated the consequences of these historical contingencies, tying particular "activist" or "quietistic" features to the past material challenges of civilizations.
According to Li, it was because Eastern civilizations-members of the "southern" belt of societies that Li identifies with Japan, Indo-China, India, Afghanistan, Egypt, and othersenjoyed so much economic prosperity and ease that they failed to cultivate the strenuous dynamism and ambition that characterizes the "northern" societies (among which he names Mongolia, Russia, Germany, Holland, Belize, England, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Italy). 32 Because the former had a bounty of women, for example, it promoted polygamy; but because the latter had fewer women than men, it promoted single-wife families. In fact, northern belt societies had to fight for survival, forcing their peoples to migrate frequently in search of stability and food. This encouraged simpler, smaller families, Li explains, which in turn led to an emphasis on individualism. Because Eastern civilizations did not feel there was value to fighting for anything, and (as a result of their family structure) did not value 30 Du, "Jing de wenming," 341. 31 Du, "Jing de wenming," 338-9. 32 Li, "Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian," 35 Li, "Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian," 60.
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The path to salvation lies precisely in integrating our original civilization, systematizing its foundations so as to render it lucid, and where it has mistakes to correct them. On the one hand we must strenuously import Western theories, and allow them to blend with our original civilization. The fragments of Western civilization are like money strewn on the ground; we can use our original civilization as a thread to tie them together. The wide variety of Western theories today, when you at first hear them, seem to be incompatible with our original civilization; but then when you understand them more fully, you can see that they can enhance and develop certain parts of our original civilization.
37
Part of the problem with using Western civilization as a foundation, Du argues, is that it lacks the unity and continuity of Chinese civilization. In the past few centuries and most notably during the current war, European values have fragmented, with the result that borrowing them leads only to increasing confusion and incoherence. Although some Western ideasscience, democracy, constitutionalism-offer promising solutions to China's current problems, their "activistic" qualities offer no integrated system adequate to direct the future course of world civilization. 38 Responding to Chen Duxiu's insinuation that by supporting particular aspects of Chinese civilization he is necessarily opposing republican government, Du points out the similarities between indigenous ideals and Western regime types.
Political regimes may change, but the political principles [behind them] do not.
Therefore, taking our indigenous civilization, with 'the way of the ruler, the integrity 37 To enter the (relatively newer) age of critique, the Chinese must oppose the (older) age of unawareness by rejecting the "old"-which Huang summarizes as advocacy of dogmatism rather than criticism, force-based government rather than self-control, integration rather than analysis, and deduction rather than induction. Only then can the Chinese embrace the proper content of thought that for Huang epitomizes the new.
46
By selecting temporal terms rather than spatial ones, Huang attempts to culturally dissociate "new thought" in general from the specificities of Western experience. In doing so, he hopes to establish the grounds for its possibility in other spaces and times. "Today people like to say that each nation has its own history and habits, and they cannot be forced to be all the same. Of course this is true; but actually this 'dissimilarity' should be understood to be 45 Huang, "Xin jiu sixiang zhi chongtu," reprinted in Du Yaquan wencun, 358. between East and West 67 -turned precisely on the assumption that particular civilizational characteristics migrate across spaces to embody global patterns of evolution. 68 For the former, it became possible to revoke modernity as a progressive temporality, and to discover instead "a dynamic anthropological space in separate but interacting cultural systems, which became accessible and appreciable only in a new global imaginary of difference."
Conclusion
When the synthesis, rejection, or appropriation of Western norms and practices is understood as a process that takes place in and through time, their diffusion becomes a matter of deliberate selection in the present, open to future contingency. The East-West civilizations discourse reveals just how fragile, and ambivalent, is the future of "Western" civilization in the "East"-a contingency that undercuts claims to the universality and naturalness of Western histories, claims, and knowledge. 70 Far from shoring up Western modernity as a universal goal, these May Fourth attempts to emulate and resist it actually contest a priori claims about its normative status or applicability of its ideas, institutions, and way of life.
Even for radical perspectives such as Chen's, who see a clear similarity of values among all the "ordered" countries of the world, the West and its values are the objects of political action, and no longer the telos of history. 71 The debate therefore troubles the persistence and permanence, if not existence, of the discursive authority of the modern West.
Ironically, this instability of Western modernity-or at least, its delegation from the category of historical certainty to political promise-makes available new space to envision China's place in the modern world. In understanding localized cultural characteristics as emerging from a past whose future transmission was radically indeterminate, participants clear ground for the recognition of global difference. They also, however, enable new forms of connection between otherwise disparate groups, by showing how the very passage of time which endowed civilizations with particular characteristics facilitates rather than inhibits the adoption of those characteristics elsewhere. For proponents of the radical argument, the 70 I am speaking here of conceptual inevitability only, and do not mean to suggest that these thinkers could somehow throw off colonial threats or Euro-American hegemony to make fully unimpeded, autonomous choices about the future of their community. 71 Chen, "Wu Ren Zui Hou Zhi Jue Wu (Our Last Awakening)," 107.
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mobility of Western science and democracy enabled Chinese modernization. From a more moderate perspective, the integrity of Chinese civilization assures the success of Western cultural grafts, even as the historically tight but now uncertain attachment of Confucian ethics to its native society becomes rearticulated as a capacity for their broader application to nonAsian societies, most particularly postwar Europe.
The point of their "Eastern" and "Western" tropes, then, may not be to sort civilizational characteristics into categories of the inevitably universal and the irredeemably particular (read: "cultural"), but to facilitate the travel of cultural products and practices across the spatial as well as temporal boundaries originally seen to contain them. By denying the inevitable inherence of cultural characteristics in particular persons or groups, the May Fourth debate reveals "East" and "West" to be spatial categories deeply contingent on human actions to situate communities within a variety of alternate trajectories. These thinkers thus made it possible to see the future, and not only the past, as a site of cultural identification and possibility.
